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Abstract 
Although the debate between realism and neoliberalism offers deep insights and raises 
fundamental questions into the nature of international systems, it also offers the confusion 
that accompanies imprecisely formulated concepts and an imperfect application of subsidiary 
ideas. Using a noncooperative extensive-form game to model anarchic international systems, 
this essay seeks to resolve that debate by restating it in a more explicit and deductive context. 
Arguing that collective security corresponds to the system envisioned by neoliberals, we begin 
by differentiating between balance of power and collective security in terms of the strategies 
that characterize the foreign policies of countries. Next, we establish that both balance of 
power and collective security can correspond to equilibria in our game. Arguments about 
goals and institutions are then recast in terms of the different properties of these equilibria. 
In particular, a balance of power equilibrium does not guarantee every country's security, so 
in it countries must be vigilant about their relative share of resources. A collective security 
equilibrium, on the other hand, ensures everyone's sovereignty, and thereby allows absolute 
resource maximization. Unlike a balance of power equilibrium, however, a collective security 
equilibrium is not strong and it is not necessarily perfect, so the institutional structures 
facilitating the realization of mutual gains from the variety of cooperative "subgames" 
characterizing the world economy play a critical role in establishing the stability of that 
equilibrium. 
Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation 
For those who are not a party to it, the debate between realists and neoliberals seems a 
curious circus. While realists struggle with the specification of state goals and with alternative 
conceptualizations of balance of power, neoliberals offer vague admonitions that goals depend 
on context. Realists see cooperation as secondary to the conflictual processes of politics even 
though stability requires some minimal level of cooperation in order to maintain alliances, 
whereas neoliberals, aside from references to examples in game theory that do not necessarily 
model any specific international process, fail to define precisely the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for cooperation. Realists have yet to contend successfully with the task of defining 
and measuring power unambiguously. Neoliberals, on the other hand, offer the idea of 
regime as a pivotal concept but provide no theoretically meaningful definition in terms of the 
rationalist paradigm they profess to adopt. Neoliberalism argues that institutions matter 
because they somehow modify the actions of decision makers both directly by altering the 
costs and benefits of actions and indirectly by modifying goals, whereas realism has difficulty 
explaining the institutions and patterns of cooperation that characterize human affairs. 
Neoliberals seeks a synthesis, but the one they offer is little more than a collage of 
disconnected ideas in a framework that is neither rigorous nor deductive; realists see a 
synthesis as inherently dangerous to the extent that it detracts from the view that power is 
the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty. 
This debate, while it raises fundamental questions, promises little hope of resolution as 
long as it is accompanied by imprecisely formulated concepts and an imperfect application 
of subsidiary ideas. For example, although neither side rejects the premise of goal directed, 
strategic behavior, important distinctions, such as between cooperation and coordination or 
direct and indirect utility, are ignored, and the understanding of game theory's implications, 
as well as of its limitations, is restricted to scenarios formed by special cases like the 
Prisoners' Dilemma. Application of the rationalist paradigm, nevertheless, offers one route 
out of this confusion. Formal theorists, of course, are more familiar with narrowly defined 
issues that lend themselves to precise formalization (e.g., voting on agendas, 2-candidate 
elections, majority-rule coalition processes, deterrence), whereas those seeking to make sense 
of macro-politics must grapple with the full complexity of human affairs. In an anarchic 
context in which rules themselves are endogenous, the application of such tools as game 
theory, which requires a highly structured specification of subject matter, seems to inhibit 
understanding. Nevertheless, if we want to avoid the tendency to inconclusive polemical 
argument, formalism is essential. 
Our starting point is a topic that normally arises within the realist's domain -- the 
distinction between collective security and balance of power as ways to organize international 
affairs and as alternative premises for foreign policy. Morgenthau and Claude distinguish 
between these two systems, but based on experiences with the abortive League of Nations and 
with the unsuccessful attempt to resurrect the League in the form of the United Nations, they 
see collective security as an idea whose time is passed -- one that military technology renders 
infeasible as a guarantor of peace and international security. Thus, Claude ( 1962) asserts: 
"Ideological commitment to the doctrine of collective security is overshadowed by the 
conviction .. . [that it] is not an appropriate response to the problem of managing international 
power relations in the present era" (p. 192) because it was "conceived with reference to a kind 
of war which must now be designated old-fashioned" (pp. 192-4). With respect to balance 
of power, on the other hand, "Twentieth-century efforts to replace the system have at most 
introduced modifications of its operative mechanisms; today, the balance of power system 
operates by default" (p. 93). 
Despite its asserted demise, the idea of collective security is germane to the realist­
neoliberal debate. First, a collective security system, characterized by the suppression of all 
threats against any state's existence, seems much like the alternative to power politics 
envisioned by liberals and neoliberals. If every country's sovereignty is assured, then 
collective security allows the maximization of absolute welfare gains that balance of power 
considerations obstruct. Second, collective security's failures are ostensibly the failures of 
institutions -- of institutions that ensure timely and appropriate responses to threats by one 
state against another. Thus, when evaluating the argument that stability arises as much from 
the complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and 
the institutions that service this complexity as it does from the operation of an "invisible 
hand" formed by the pursuit of national power, we should ask why institutions are seen as 
facilitating stability in one context, but are presumed to be inadequate in the classical 
conceptualization of collective security. 
With respect to the contribution that we might make to answering such questions, our 
objective is to specify more precisely the distinction between balance of power and collective 
security so that we can learn why one idea seems to have survived better than the other. In 
this way we hope to assess whether the realist-neoliberal debate arises because of 
fundamentally different theoretical views, or whether it can be interpreted merely as 
differences in emphasis on key parameters. Specifically, we offer an extensive-form, game 
theoretic model of anarchic systems in order to learn whether balance of power and collective 
security can each correspond to an equilibrium. Arguments about goals and institutions are 
then recast in terms of the different properties of these equilibria. 
I .  Problems of Conceptualization and Definition
To be certain that our analysis does not miss the point of the realist-neoliberal debate we 
begin with a reexamination of the issues in it, with the understanding that realists and 
neo!ibera!s agree on several matters. First, both sides of the debate see international politics 
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as anarchic, and agree that the institutional structure and cooperation and coordination found 
in international affairs are endogenous -- are the product of self-enforcing action on the part 
of a system's constituent parts. Second, both sides, although appreciating the imperatives of 
domestic politics, see the necessity, as an abstraction, for conceptualizing nation-states as 
unitary actors and as the primary constituent parts of international systems. Third, both see 
the necessity for abiding by the assumption that these unitary nation-states are strategic, goal 
directed decision-makers. Beyond this, however, several problems impede the development 
of an appropriate theory and the determination of how the ideas of collective security versus 
balance of power pertain to the realist-neoliberal debate. 
Goals and Equilibria: Perhaps nowhere is disagreement greater than it is over the goals 
we should impute to nation-states. Neoliberals argue "that states seek to maximize their 
individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others . . .  [whereas] 
realists find that states are positional .. . and worry that their partners might gain more from 
cooperation than they do" (Grieco 1988:487). Considerable confusion, however, accompanies 
this disagreement. Gilpin ( 1982:7), for example, asserts that "International relations continue 
to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of 
anarchy." Aside from measurement problems, power is relative and in constant supply, so if 
nations maximize it, then international affairs is constant sum. But, although wealth is a 
component of power, wealth can be defined in absolute terms, and its maximization does 
not preclude all members of a system from gaining simultaneously. Waltz ( l959:i98) tries to 
avoid ambiguity by arguing that "in a condition of anarchy, relative gain is more important 
than absolute gain," but confounding matters is the issue of sovereignty and its role in the 
goal of power maximization. If increasing one's power also increases one's vulnerability (as 
when any such increase, while decreasing a second state's power, also increases a third state's 
power to a proportionally greater degree), then what actions should a decision maker take? 
Thus, Waltz ( 1979:126) adds the qualification that "the first concern of states in not to 
maximize power but to maintain their position in the system." Neoliberalism, on the other 
hand, offers a vaguer assumption: "Under different systemic conditions states will define their 
self-interest differently .. . where survival is at stake efforts to maintain autonomy may take 
precedence over all other activities, but where the environment is relatively benign energies 
will also be directed to fulfilling other goals." (Keohane 1 989:62. emphasis added). 
To resolve this debate over goals we must first distinguish between ultimate ends and 
intermediate objectives as they manifest themselves in particular circumstances, since even 
if someone is motivated primarily by measures of their personal well being, it is not 
unreasonable to postulate a strategic concern with relative variables. This part of the realist­
neoliberal debate, then, can be reformulated in terms of the viability of alternative equilibria, 
because it is equilibria that define the context of action. Realists perceive a single compelling 
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equilibrium -- a balance of power -- in which states must be vigilant about relative position. 
Neoliberals see the complex interdependencies of contemporary affairs as occasioning a 
different kind of equilibrium in which states can pursue pure welfare maximization because 
threats to sovereignty are somehow not part of the character of the strategies that sustain the 
equilibrium: "Among republics, at any rate, military threats may be insignificant, expanding 
the potential area for cooperation and reducing both the role of force and the emphasis states 
place on their relative power positions in the international system" (Keohane and Nye 
1989:247). 
Resolution of the realist-neoliberal debate over goals, then, requires that we ascertain 
whether or under what conditions equilibria of both types exist. Our approach is to suppose 
that the primary goal of states is to maintain their sovereignty, and, simplifying matters, to 
assume that total resources are constant, so that maximizing relative and absolute gains are 
equivalent. Then, in partial support of the realist view, we establish the existence of a 
balance of power equilibrium in which relative resource maximization is the sole sustainable 
subsidiary goal because sovereignty is not assured for all players. On the other hand, we 
accommodate the possibility that "states concerned with self-preservation do not seek to 
maximize their power when they are not in danger" (Keohane 1989:47) by establishing the 
existence of a second equilibrium -- a collective security equilibrium -- in which everyone's 
sovereignty is assured, regardless of how resources are distributed. We then use this fact to 
infer, in accordance with the neoliberal view, that coilective securiiy equilibria ailow the 
pursuit of auxiliary policies that maximize absolute welfare. 
Thus, by finding two equilibria that establish different conditions for the preservation of 
sovereignty, we give theoretical meaning to Keohane's previously cited assertion that "Under 
different systemic conditions states will define their self-interest differently ... " With the 
alternative goals of relative versus absolute resource gains thus rendered endogenous and 
dependent on whether a balance of power or a collective security equilibrium prevails, the 
realist-neoliberal debate can then focus on the ease with which one equilibrium as against the 
other can be sustained. 
The Role of Institutions: Neoliberals might believe that imposing the constant-sum 
condition in our model either ends debate or biases it in favor of realism. Cooperation, 
though, is possible in nearly all contexts, so the relevance of institutions should not depend 
on whether international politics is constant or nonconstant sum. Indeed, as Keohane 
( 1989: 1 09) observes, it is not the case that "the whole process leading to the formation of a 
new international regime will yield overall welfare benefits. Outsiders may suffer . . .  [and 
some regimes such as alliances and cartels] are specifically designed to impose costs on them." 
So the only general limitation placed on the domain of his perspective by the argument that 
"sufficient complementarily or common interests exist so that agreements benefiting all 
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essential regime members can be made" is that international politics concerns three or more 
players. Neoliberals who believe that it is necessary to limit their domain to nonconstant sum 
situations, then, are giving away too much. Conversely, realists who see cooperation as 
impossible are drawing an incorrect inference from the presumed anarchic, constant-sum 
system they believe is most relevant. Constant sum games preclude the possibility of mutual 
gains only if there are two players, whereas n-person constant sum games can promise 
important gains to cooperation and coordination -- the sole difference being whether the 
gains necessarily come from some other player or can come from nature as well. 
An additional source of confusion involves the distinction between cooperation and 
coordination, which is illustrated by Keohane's ( 1984:51)  statement that "we can evaluate the 
impact of cooperation by measuring the difference between the actual outcome and the 
situation that would have obtained in the absence of coordination .. ." Two or more people 
cooperate whenever they choose strategies to take mutual advantage of nature or someone 
else, and cooperation is self-enforcing whenever such strategies correspond to a [Nash, 
subgame perfect, perfect, sequential, etc.] equilibrium in the noncooperative representation 
of the situation being modeled. Coordination, on the other hand, refers to the ability of 
players to achieve a particular equilibrium. Most games -- especially the repeated games that 
most appropriately model international affairs -- have a great many equilibria, and, barring 
exogenous considerations, there need not be any guarantee that a particular equilibrium or 
that any equilibrium whatsoever will be realized. So, we must be concerned not only with 
ensuring that cooperation is an equilibrium, we must also be concerned that such· an 
equilibrium prevails in the uncoordinated action of international systems. 
Turning specifically to the role of institutions, we must contend with the fact that 
neoliberals are ambiguous about what it is that institutions do, or even for that matter what 
institutions are. For Keohane ( 1989:162) "'institution' may refer to a general pattern or 
categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally of 
informally organized." We can infer, then, that institutions include formal organizations such 
as the United Nations, formally stated agreements such as GA TT, and alliances themselves.
Insofar as function is concerned, we are told that institutions can be merely agents for 
facilitating cooperation ("International institutions have the potential for facilitating 
cooperation" (Keohane 1989:1 74)) or that they are an essential component of cooperation 
("International institutions make it possible for states to take action that would otherwise be 
inconceivable" (Keohane, 1 989:5)). In contrast, realism argues that "institutions are unable 
to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on inter-state cooperation" (Grieco 1 988:485), so, 
in this view, if institutions have any role, it is merely that of facilitating the formation and 
maintenance of alliances that countries use to pursue power or to maintain sovereignty. 
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However, we can discern explicit roles for institutions if both a balance of power and a 
collective security equilibrium exist. First, institutions must facilitate the coordination of 
action so that some equilibrium is achieved. It is perhaps this function that Keohane and Nye 
( 1989:247) have in mind when they argue that interdependence and institutions give rise to 
"groups of states which [develop] reliable expectations of peaceful relations and thereby 
[overcome] the security dilemma that realists see as characterizing international politics." 
Second, institutions are required to "service" alliances in a balance of power, and to realize 
the welfare gains that states might pursue under collective security. Whether institutions are 
more critical for maintaining one equilibrium as against another, however, depends on the 
properties of those equilibria, which, along with existence, is the issue to which we now turn. 
2. Anarchy, Balance of Power, and Collective Security
The preceding discussion defines the questions that our analysis must confront: Even if
self-enforcing cooperative equilibria exist, are coordination mechanisms necessary to ensure 
that a particular equilibrium prevails? Is a balance-of-power equilibrium more stable than 
the equilibria envisioned by neoliberals? Is there a special role for institutions in achieving 
and maintaining equilibria other than the type envisioned by realists and do these alternative 
equilibria ensure stability in such a way as to allow the pursuit of subsidiary welfare 
maximizing programs? Indeed, given the emphasis that neoliberals place on modeling 
Prisoners' Dilemmas and the like, we also ask whether the successful pursuit of subsidiary 
welfare maximizing policies are essential to "servicing" such alternative equilibria? 
We approach these questions by reexamining a game theoretic model of international 
conflict (Niau and Ordeshook 1989) that assumes that, conditional on maintaining their 
sovereignty, countries pursue a single transferable resource in constant supply. We impose 
this assumption because, first, we do not want to secure endogenously enforced cooperation 
simply by making the gains from cooperating great. Sustaining cooperation in the context of 
constant sum competition reveals more clearly the role that institutions can play in 
ameliorating international conflict. Second, we do not want to resolve the realist-neoliberal 
debate merely by supposing that sovereignty is not an issue; instead, we want to learn whether 
the type of cooperation that neoliberals envision in which states pursue auxiliary welfare­
maximizing policies can arise in an otherwise constant-sum context. 
Next, we differentiate between two forms of stability so as to accommodate the fact that 
the issue of sovereignty is qualitatively different from that of how nations contend with the 
ebb and flow of economic and military capabilities. Briefly, system-stability implies that 
all countries can ensure their sovereignty -- that no country will have its resources reduced 
to zero -- whereas resource-stability implies that no reallocation of resources occurs.1
System-stability, then, is the sort of stability envisioned as the consequence of balance of 
6 
power, whereas resource-stability, which implies system-stability, corresponds to the 
presumed consequence of an all-encompassing collective security equilibrium. 
Our model of anarchy, now, supposes that the resources controlled by each country are 
the sole determinant of winning and losing, that threats and counter-threats are the 
mechanisms whereby countries secure resources from each other, that countries join coalitions 
because it is in their individual interest to do so, and that no exogenous constraints ameliorate 
conflict. Informally, the game we use to model anarchic systems proceeds as follows: A 
country, say i, randomly chosen by nature, either offers an initial threat or it "passes," where 
the threat is a new resource distribution and a proposed threatening coalition C. If i passes, 
nature selects another country. If i threatens, its partners in C must decided whether or not 
to participate in the threat. Only if all such partners choose to participate does i's threat call 
for a response by the threatened countries. Responses are of two types. First, each 
threatened country, taken in sequence, can offer a counter-threat, which is a new threat, and 
which, if unanimously accepted by the newly proposed coalition, cancels the original threat 
and becomes the new current threat. The second type of response is a proposal by one or 
more threatened countries to surrender resources to one or more members of the originally 
threatening coalition. If a transfer is accepted by the countries involved, it determines a new 
status quo, and the game proceeds as before. 
Of course, this model, which we formalize in the next section, greatly abstracts from 
reality and describes anarchy in a highly structured way. Nevertheless, our game does 
incorporate the assumptions that "power" is the ultimate determinant of who can win and who 
can lose, that threats and counters are the mechanisms whereby countries secure resources 
from others, and that countries join coalitions because it is in their individual interest to do 
so and not because exogeneously imposed constraints induce cooperation. 
To analyze such a game, however, we must constrain the strategies that we admit as 
sources of equilibria, because with threats and counters allowed to sequence forever, there 
are infinitely many strategies. Moreover, folk theorems tell us that nearly any "reasonable" 
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium, given an appropriate specification of strategies. 
However, because of the complexity of many of these strategies, the presumption that all 
strategies are feasible strains credulity. Fortunately, the notions of balance of power and 
collective security point us in the direction of the most intuitively plausible possibilities. 
To model balance of power, we suppose that strategies are stationary -- that each country 
makes the same choices whenever it encounters the same threat, and that it thereby ignores 
who made a threat or who agreed to participate in a threat.2 In a balance of power system,
then, "all states are potentially fit alliance partners; none is seen as much more evil than any 
other" (Jervis 1986:60). To model collective security, on the other hand, we look at simple 
punishment strategies, where punishment is directed against those who try to upset the status 
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quo either by making a threat or by agreeing to participate in it. The strategies forming a 
collective security equilibrium, then, are not stationary because they posit the formation of 
specific alliances, depending on who defects from the status quo. 
Equilibria supported by stationary strategies, then, are of special interest because they 
correspond to the equilibria that realists perceive as the primary model of international 
stability. So, if we find such equilibria and learn also that only countries controlling some 
critical relative level of resources can ensure their sovereignty in it, then in accordance with 
realism's arguments about goals, countries must be vigilant about relative gains and losses. 
If, however, there also exists an equilibrium supported by punishment strategies in which no 
country offers an initial threat, then, in accordance with the neoliberal argument, realization 
of this equilibrium renders the issue of sovereignty and relative position less salient. And if 
the benefits that accrue through free trade and the like require a non-conflictual world, and 
if these benefits disappear when agreements to achieve them are disrupted by competition 
over relative position, then the issue confronting us, and which bears directly on the realist­
neoliberal debate, is whether such an equilibrium can be sustained endogenously or whether 
its enforcement requires attending to the nurturing of these benefits. If this collective 
security equilibrium is as attractive as a balance of power equilibrium, then the sole critical 
role of institutions is to facilitate coordination so as to ensure that one equilibria in particular 
is achieved. But if such equilibria require "nurturing," then institutions must, in addition to 
coordinating action, ensure that this nurturing occurs. 
3. A Formal Model and a Theorem About Balance of Power
To present our model formally requires some notation. Briefly, we let (S,r0) denote a 
system, where S = (1 ,2, . . .  ,n) is the set of countries and r0 = (r01, r02, .. .  ,r0n) is the distribution
of resources across S. For convenience, we let r01 > r02 > . . .  > r0n > 0. If r(C) is the sum of
resources controlled by the members of the coalition C, and if R denotes the total resources 
in the system, then the coalition C is winning if r(C) > R/2, it is losing if r(C) < R/2, and it 
is minimal winning if, for all i in C, C-(i} is losing. Countries in S who are part of at least 
one minimal winning coalition are essential: otherwise they are inessential. If r0; > R/2, i is
predominant -- it is winning against all other countries and it can incorporate their resources 
at will -- so every country has an incentive to avoid the possibility that some other country 
becomes predominant. If r0; = R/2, i is near-predominant. With respect to the status quo
distribution r0, max[C) denotes the country in C with the greatest total of resources. Finally, 
the game r that we use to model conflict proceeds as follows:
( I )  Nature randomly selects i in S; 
(2) i offers a threat (r,C), i in C, or i passes. If i passes, we return to (!). If i threatens and 
if r .  > r0 . , j is an active member of C, whereas r . = r0J. for the passive members of C. J J J 
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(3) The members of C-(i} simultaneously choose between approving or rejecting (r,C). If no 
j in C-{i} rejects, then (r,C) becomes the current threat; otherwise, return to ( I ). 
(4) With (r,C) the current threat, nature randomly orders the members of S-C. 
(5) With m in S-C offering the first counter, a counter takes one of two forms: a new threat, 
(r',C'), m in C'; or a resource transfer from S-C to one or more members of C. We denote 
those party to the transfer by C'. 
(6) The members of C'-{m} simultaneously choose between approving or rejecting (r',C').
If a counter which is itself a threat is approved unanimously, it becomes the new current 
threat, and we return to (4). If one or more members of C'-(m} reject the counter, we 
select the next threatened country in the order chosen by nature and we return to (5). For 
counters that are resource-transfers, unanimous acceptance renders the transfer the new 
status quo and we return to (I). 
(7) If the counter of the last threatened country is rejected, the resource distribution of the
current threat becomes the status quo and we return to ( I ). 
Requiring in (3) and (6) that members of C-{i} and C'-(m) act simultaneously rather than 
sequentially is arbitrary, so we show later that this assumption is important to the relative 
stability of collective security equilibria, but not to balance of power equilibria. However, 
the feature of r that we want to emphasize is that it is a recursive game, because it allows for
the possibility that threats and counters, as well as resource reallocations, continue in 
sequence forever. Thus, the analysis of such games cannot proceed in the same way that we 
treat, say, finite voting agendas or infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemmas. With a finite 
agenda, we can "work backwards" from the game's terminal nodes to deduce equilibrium 
choices at earlier nodes, but here some branches of the extensive form do not lead to terminal 
nodes. Similarly, the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is effectively rendered finite by 
supposing that the stream of payoffs accruing to the players are subject to a time discount. 
But in our game there is no "stream" of payoffs, and, in fact, all action may simply take place 
in the minds of participants as they contemplate possibilities, in which case there is no natural 
discount that can be applied to evaluate alternative resource distributions. 
Wagner ( 1 986:551 )  outlines our game's correct treatment "the basic question that concerns 
us is whether states will act so as to eliminate other states. If one state is eliminated from a 
four-actor game, for example, the result is to precipitate a three-actor game. If a value can 
be assigned to such a subgame for each player, it is possible to determine whether any players 
have an incentive to eliminate other players." We proceed, then, by pretending that r is finite
by supposing that we know the consequences of all branches in its extensive form. After 
postulating these consequences, an equilibrium is characterized by strategies in which no one 
has an incentive to defect unilaterally to any choice not dictated by that player's strategy, and 
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the postulated consequences are consistent in that they are "self-fulfilling prophesies" -- the 
subgame perfect choices they imply must yield those consequences. 
Because our discussion of collective security builds on an analysis of balance of power, 
we focus initially on stationary strategies. Supposing, then, that all countries respond 
identically to (r ,C) regardless of who makes this threat and regardless of the histories 
associated with each player, we let r, denote the game that follows the threat of (r,C) and its
acceptance. Suppose country i associates the value v ;(f ,) with playing that sub-game, then
the vector v(r,) = (v1(r,), ... ,vn(r,)) -- the continuation value of r, -- specifies what the
countries believe follows from the approval of (r,C). Thus, v ;(r ,), when compared against
whatever follows if (r,C) is rejected, determines i's preference for acceptance or rejection of 
(r,C) or for making this threat in the first place. Once values for all threats are specified we 
can assume that the acceptance of a threat or counter is a terminal node with its continuation 
value as the "final outcome." We then analyze r like a finite extensive-form game of 
complete information and we deduce sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies by working 
backwards from the terminal nodes in the same way we treat finite agendas in majority 
voting games -- we deduce what each country ought to do any time it must choose a threat, 
a counter, or accepting or rejecting a threat or counter. 
The particular difficulty here is that continuation values are endogenous to the situation -
- what follows depends on strategies, and strategies depend on what follows. An equilibrium, 
then, is a set of continuation values -- one for each threat -- and a set of strategies for each 
country such that these values and strategies are consistent. Thus, in equilibrium, the choices 
that the continuation values imply -- the strategies that are a subgame perfect equilibrium 
given the continuation values -- must, in turn, imply those continuation values. 
The way in which we form continuation values and establish consistency is to first offer 
a 2-way classification of threats, where all the members of one class are associated with one 
type of continuation value and all remaining threats are associated with a second type of 
continuation value. We proceed by first identifying Type 1 threats, which satisfies four 
conditions: (i) the largest member of the threatening coalition C (max[C]) can in principle at 
least coalesce with the threatened countries S-C to form a new winning coalition; (ii) the 
threatened countries are threatened with elimination; (iii) the threat proposes to render the 
largest country in C near-predominant; and (iv) there is no other winning coalition C' such
that C' and C share only one member where that member is the largest country in C' but 
not in c.3 Next, we define primary threats, which are particular Type 1 threats. Letting
L be those countries in S who can be the largest member of a minimal winning coalition, the 
set of primary threats satisfy two conditions: First for no two primary threats (r,C) and 
(r' ,C') is it the case that C and C' have a unique common member corresponding to the largest 
member of C and C' such that the remaining members of C and C' are in S-L. This 
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requirement, after continuation values are assigned, ensures that no primary threat is an 
effective counter against another such threat. Second, the set of primary threats is maximal 
in the sense that there not exist a winning coalition with a Type l threat that can be added 
to this set so as not to violate its first characteristic, which assures us that nothing is 
precluded from this set that cannot be effectively countered.4
Assuming that countries abide by stationary strategies, the continuation values that can 
be shown to be consistent with subgame perfection imply the following; if (r,C) is not a 
primary threat, then no country is assured of becoming near-predominant, members of S-L 
do not gain resources, and no member of C n L gains resources if it is smaller than the largest 
threatened country. If (r,C) is a primary threat, then the largest threatening country becomes 
near-predominant at the expense of threatened countries, and the remaining members of the 
threatening coalition retain the resources they currently control. 5 
The additional assumptions we require to establish this consistency are, first, that a near­
predominant country can take advantage of conflicts among other countries so as to become 
predominant. Hence, systems with a near-predominant country are "frozen." Second, to 
accommodate war costs, we assume that if i can become near-predominant by implementing 
a threat or by having countries transfer enough resources to render i near-predominant, i 
prefers the transfer. So if max[C] denotes the largest member of C with respect to the 
current, status quo, resource distribution, then the system is frozen if S-C offers to render 
max[C] near-predominant. Clearly, if S-C prefers freezing the system, it should transfer to 
max[C], since this choice minimizes the resources that S-C must surrender. And max[C] 
accepts the offer: Because attempts to secure more than R/2 will be blocked, securing R/2 
by transfer is max[C]'s most preferred feasible outcome. Finally, because elimination is 
different from merely having a small amount of resources, we suppose that countries are risk 
averse with respect to the possibility of elimination -- a country attributes a value of -ooto 
any outcome in which it is eliminated. These assumptions and the preceding assignment of 
continuation values allow us to establish the following important result: 
If all countries are essential, and if all countries abide by stationary strategies, then ( S.t0) 
is necessarily system-stable (Niou and Ordeshook 1989). 
Furthermore, if we allow countries to make sequential threats (i.e., i proposes that C threatens 
j E S-C, then k E S-C, etc.), then inessential countries as well as smaller essential ones will 
be unable to assure their sovereignty in any n-country system. 
These facts establish the existence of a balance of power equilibrium ensuring the 
sovereignty of "larger" states, but not of smaller ones. Hence, countries must be vigilant 
about their relative share of resources. Thus, aside from the institutional mechanisms that 
may be required to coordinate strategies and to service alliances, we do not find in this 
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equilibrium much room for those international institutions that allow countries to pursue 
welfare maximizing policies without regard for the gains that others might realize. Moreover, 
in addition to being perfect, and thus self-enforcing, this equilibrium is also strong in the 
following sense: The "largest" countries (those in L), if given the opportunity to make a 
threat, prefer to do so because they gain and thereby avoid the possibility of loss, whereas 
smaller countries, although unable to gain by participating in a threat, avoid the possibility 
of losses by doing so. So if i believes that all others in S will choose their equilibrium 
strategies, then i has a positive incentive to make or to agree to primary threats that include 
it in the threatening coalition, since not doing so diminishes i's utility. A balance of power 
equilibrium, then, is attractive. 
4. The Example of 4-Country Systems
Before we proceed to an analysis of collective security equilibria, let us look at the nature 
of a balance of power equilibrium in two alternative 4-country examples -- one for which 
r0 = ( 1 10,80,60,50) and a second in which r0 = ( 1 00,95,75,30) -- where the critical difference
between these examples is that country 4 is essential in the first but not in the second 
example. What we propose to show is that in a balance of power equilibrium, the first 
distribution occasions system-stability whereas country 4 is eliminated if the second 
distribution applies. 
Although our theoretical results apply even when we allow all possible threats, we limit 
discussion here for purposes of an example to specific threats and counters. Specifically, 
consider the following threats and conjectured continuation values (where a <  1 50, b < 150, 
c < 60, and d < 50, and where the values of a, b, c, and d depend on the threat in question), 
which consists of a sample of non-primary threats and all primary threats for this game: 
non-primary threats 
•(r<150, 150,0,0,l = (a,b,60,50)
•(f<15o,o, 150,0,l = (a,b,c,50)
•(f<150,o,o, 150,l = (a,b,60,d)
primary threats 
•(f<150,85,65,0,> = ( 1 50,80,60,10)
•(f(150,85,0,65» = ( 1 50,80,20,50)
•(f(150,0,75,75» = ( 150,40,60,50)
•(r<o, 150,75,75,l = (40, 1 50,60,50)
Referring to Figure I, suppose country l proposes the primary threats, ( 1 50,85,0,65), and
that countries 2 and 4 accept. Country 3 has five alternative actions, but: ( I )  if 3 counters
with ( 1 50,0, 150,0), then I rejects since, by assumption, v1(r<15o,o, 150,0,) =a <  1 50 and 
rejection implements a threat giving 150 to l; (2) if 3 proposes ( 150,0,75,75), then 4 rejects
since v4(r<iso,o,75,75,) = 50 < 65; (3) if 3 proposes (0, 1 50,75,75), then 4 rejects for the same
reason; and (4) if 3 proposes ( 150,85,65,0), then 2 rejects since vlr<150,85,65,0,l = 80 < 85.
Hence, the only alternative available to 3 is to transfer resources to l ,  in which case, as 
conjectured, •(f<lSo,ss,6s,o,l = ( 1 50,80,20,50). An equivalent analysis holds for the threats
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corresponding to the distributions (1 50,85,65,0), (150,0,75,75), and (0,150,75,75). 
The situation is more complicated if two countries are threatened, as when (1,2) threatens 
(3,4} with (1 50,150,0,0). Figure 2 shows the part of the extensive form that pertains after 
such a threat is accepted, and after nature selects 3 to offer the first counter (the situation 
is symmetric if 4 counters first). As before, 3 has four counter-threats, but their rejection, 
rather than leading to the implementation of the threat, gives 4 an opportunity to offer a 
counter. Since 4's options are independent of 3's choice, Figure 2 portrays only one instance 
of 4's decision. Working backwards on the extensive form so as to identify subgame-perfect 
equilibrium strategies, and looking at 4's decision, we see that: ( I )  if 4 offers ( 150,0,0,1 50),
I is certain to reject since v1(rc15o,o,o,150iJ =a <  150; (2) if 4 offers ( 1 50,85,0,65), then 2
rejects since v2(rc150,85,0,651) = 80 < 150; and (3) if 4 offers ( 1 50,0,75,75) or (0,1 50,75,75),
then ( 1 ,3} and (2,3), respectively, accept. Since 4 is indifferent between offering 
( 1 50,0,75,75) and (0,1 50,75,75), we suppose that 4 chooses one or the other with equal 
probability. In any event, there is no reason for 4 to consider a transfer to I .  
Looking now at 3's decision in Figure 2, because rejection of any counter by 3 yields a 
lottery between v(rc150,0,75,751) = (150,40,60,50) and v(rc0,150,75,751) = (40,1 50,60,50), if I 
prefers v1( 150,0, 150,0) to a lottery between 150 and 40, 3 does not counter with ( 1 50,0,150,0)
-- v3(fc150 0 150 01) = c < r03 and, as we see shortly, 3 has better choices. But if I prefers the
• • • 
lottery, then the counter (1 50,0,150,0) is equivalent to the counter (150,85,65,0), since 2 
rejects in favor of the lottery. Finally, the counters (1 50,0,75,75) and (0,150,75,75) -- both 
of which yield 3 a payoff of 60 -- are accepted by ( 1 ,4} and (2,4}, respectively. Now, 
though, we can introduce an assumption that does not affect our conclusions here, but which 
simplifies the generalization of our analysis; namely, suppose i E S-C, to counter (r,C), 
chooses (r' ,C') such that S-C c C' whenever it is otherwise indifferent. The rationale for this 
assumption is that the threat against S-C makes the formation of S-C less costly (also, if i is 
indifferent, such a choice can characterize an equilibrium strategy since i has no positive 
incentive to choose differently). Presently, this assumption implies that 3 counters with 
( 1 50,0,75,75) or (0,150,75,75). Since an identical argument holds if 4 counters first, 
v(fc150, 150,0,01) is a lottery between (150,40,60,50) and (40,150,60,50) as originally asserted.
We can repeat this analysis for the other listed threats. So, establishing in this way that
the posited continuation values are consistent with subgame perfection, we must now identify 
a symmetric stationary equilibrium for the full game. Consider the following two 
characterizations of equilibria with respect to the game's first move: 
Case ( 1 ): no player makes or accepts an initial threat unless such action promises a gain;
Case (2): players make or accept initial threats if doing so promises no loss. 
For case ( l ), I and 2 prefer to coalesce with 3 and 4, but, under the assumption of the
presumed equiiibrium, 3 and 4 do not accept initial offers since no offer yields them a gain. 
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Moreover, neither 3 nor 4 gains by defecting unilaterally from its strategy. Hence, a situation 
in which no threats are made is an equilibrium. However, case (I ) cannot be to a perfect
equilibrium:6 If there is a chance that 4 will accept a threat in which it does not lose, then 3
should not forego participating in threats that freeze the system. This argument bears on case 
(2). If everyone accepts threats in which they do not lose, then no one has an incentive to 
switch to a strategy of accepting or making threats only if it gains. Thus, given the 
limitations on threats we impose, our 4-country example, assuming stationary strategies, is 
necessarily system-stable, but only resource-instability corresponds to a perfect equilibrium. 
Now consider the second example in which r0 = ( 1 00,95, 75,30), so country 4 cannot form 
a minimal winning coalition. It is straightforward to show, now, that threats by I and 2 
against 4 in the form ( 1 10,105,85,0) eliminate 4; however, if, for example, I is selected to 
make the first move, it should threaten ( 1 50,0,1 50,0) or ( 150,0,120,30), in which case 2 and 
4 or 2 alone transfer to l; but in either case 4 is not eliminated. On the other hand, suppose 
country 3 moves first and threatens ( 1 10, I 05,85,0), i.e., 3 proposes to eliminate 4 and 
distribute its resources evenly among I, 2, and 3 .  Referring to Figure 3, if I and 2 accept,
4 cannot respond with a threat such as ( 1 50,0, 150-S,S) or (0, 1 50, 1 50-S,S) that attracts 3, 
because 3 knows that such threats merely lead to transfers between I and 2 whereas rejection
increases 3's resources to 85. On the other hand, if 4 responds with a threat against 3, such 
as ( 1 50, 1 50-S,0,S), then 3 can counter either with a threat against I or a threat against 2.
Thus, I or 2 reject 4's counter. Thus, 4 must transfer to one country or another. If 4
transfers all of its resources, it is, of course, eliminated; on the other hand, if it only offers 
I, 2, or 3 something more than ten units of resources, then this action merely opens the door 
to the possibility that 4's resources will incrementaly approach zero. Thus, 
((1 ,2,3,4),(100,95,75,30)) is not system-stable, because country 4 can be eliminated. 
5. Collective Security
Turning now to the notion of collective security, modeled by punishment strategies 
designed to preserve the status quo, we first simplify the extensive game-forms with which 
we must contend, by modifying the assumption that nature chooses randomly from S after 
a threat is rejected -- the assumption that we return to step (I) if a threat is not unanimously
accepted in step (3 ). Without altering our conclusions about the nature of balance of power 
equilibria, we let D denote the countries that are the potential targets of punishment as 
determined by the strategy specified below, and we assume that nature chooses from the set 
S-D. That is, nature chooses from those players who will administer a punishment (if a point 
in the game is ever reached in which D = S, then suppose that nature thereafter chooses from 
S with uniform probability). 
Our next step is to isolate a particular type of punishment strategy that matches the 
simplicity of stationary strategies, because we do not want to confront the objection that 


















balance of power equilibria are somehow easier to compute and realize. Hence, we restrict 
our attention to the following characterization: 
(a) No country proposes an initial threat; 
(b) No country accep:� an initial threat if one is offered; 
(c) Threats are directed against one or more defectors; 
(d) Countries accept threats that are punishments; 
(e) Whenever any threat is accepted, all countries use stationary strategies thereafter. 
Players defecting from (a)-(d) are added to D and are thereafter subject to punishment. 
To proceed we must now modify our notation for continuation values. Assume that 
subgames begin after countries pass, or after all relevant countries choose between accepting 
and rejecting the last offered threat, we let •D(r r> = (vD 1(r r), .. . , vD n(r r)) denote the
continuation value of the subgame beginning after the threat (r,C) is made and accepted, 
where D is the current set of defectors. If there is no current threat (e.g., a country passes), 
then v0(r 0) denotes the corresponding continuation value. The general form we assume for
v0 /f rl and vD /f 0) is as follows:
v0/fr) = v/fr) ( 1 )  
{ = r0i if j � D and j i' max(S-D]
v0/f0) = a, where r0i <as. R/2, if j � D and j = max(S-D] 
< r0 i otherwise.
(2) 
Expression ( 1 )  states that, in accordance with (e), if there is a standing threat, then all 
countries play stationary strategies thereafter and continuation values are as specified in 
footnote 5. On the other hand, if there is no current threat, the specification of v0 /f 0) in
expression (2) states that if j is not in D -- if the presumed equilibrium does not target j for 
punishment -- and if j is not the largest member of S-D, then j merely retains its current 
resource allocation. If j is not a target for punishment but if it is the largest member of S­
D, j receives a transfer that either renders j near-predominant or which eliminates S-C. 7 
Finally, if j e D, then j's expected payoff is less than its current resource holdings. 
These definitions yield the following general result about collective security:8
If IS I> 3, and if there are four or more essential countries, the strategy described in (a)­
( e) yields a strong subgame perfect equilibrium in which no country makes an initial threat 
and no country is eliminated, regardless of whether S contains inessential countries.9
We limit the domain of this result to systems with four or more essential countries, 
because otherwise, although a collective security equilibrium exists, it is neither strong nor 
subgame perfect (Niou and Ordeshook 1989). The weakness of such equilibria here arises 
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because if there are only three essential countries, only 2-country coalitions can form primary 
threats. For example, if r0 = ( 120, 100,80) and if country 3 defects by proposing the primary 
threat ( 1 50,0, 150), then 1 has a positive incentive to accept this threat -- in accordance with 
(e) and with the postulated continuation values for primary threats when stationary strategies 
are used, the eventual outcome is ( 1 50, 70,80). Country 3, of course, is indifferent between 
threatening ( 1 50,0, 1 50) or passing, which renders the equilibrium weak rather than strong, 
and l 's willingness to accept the threat rather than punish 3 precludes subgame perfection. 
In larger systems, on the other hand, the lemma in footnote 8 establishes that more than 
one country must accept a proposed primary threat, and this fact renders a collective security 
equilibrium both strong and subgame perfect. To illustrate, suppose again that r0 = 
( l  1 0,80,60,50), and referring to Figure 4, if 3 and 4 accept 2's offer, then, in accordance with 
(e), (40,1 50,60,50) prevails (the dashed lines denote information sets so that, for example, 
when 4 chooses between accept and reject, 4 does not know 3's choice). But if 3 alone 
accepts 2's threat, since D = (2,3), nature chooses between 1 and 4 to make the next move.
Suppose 1 is chosen. If, in accordance with (c), 1 proposes ( 1 50,85,0,65) to punish 3, if 2 and 
4 accept, and if the preceding continuation values hold, then ( 1 50,80,20,50) prevails. Figure 
4 shows, moreover, that 2 and 4 have no incentive to reject l 's proposal. Similarly, if 1 
punishes 2 by proposing ( I  50,0, 75, 75), then ( 1 50,40,60,50) prevails. Because 1 50 is I 's
greatest feasible payoff, it has no positive incentive to do anything other than propose to 
punish 3 or 2 { I  will not propose to punish both simultaneously because ( 1 50,0,0, 1 50) is not
a primary threat and yields 1 an expected return of less than 1 50). A parallel argument shows 
that if 4 moves instead of I ,  4 has no incentive to offer different threats. Thus, assuming
that l and 4 choose between their two punishment strategies with probability a and I -a, then 
v<2•3}(r 0) = a( 1 50,80,20,50) + ( l -a)(l 50,40,60,50), which is consistent with the assumption
in expression (2) that v<Z, 3} (r ) = R/2 v<2•3> (r ) < r0 v<Z.3} (r ) < r0 and max[S-01=1 o ' 2 o 2' 3 o 3' 
vC2·3\(r
0
) = r04• A parallel argument holds if 4 defects by accepting 2's offer, so consider 
the final possibility -- that 3 and 4 reject 2's offer. At this point, D = (2), so nature chooses
I ,  3 or 4 for the next move. As Figure 4 reveals, however, none of these countries has a
positive incentive to propose anything other than ( 150,0,75,75). Thus, neither 3 nor 4 has any 
unilateral incentive to defect from (b), in which case 2 has no incentive to defect from (a). 
Similar analyses of the remaining initial threats establishes the overall consistency of the 
proposed continuation values, and in this way we see that the proposed punishment strategies, 
in conjunction with the postulated continuation values, supports a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which no country makes an initial threat. It is also straightforward to see that 
this equilibrium is perfect. 
Now let r0 = ( 1 00,95,75,30) so that 4 is inessential, and suppose 3 defects from (a) by 
proposing the same threat against 4 that eliminates 4 in a balance of power system, 
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( 1 10,105,85,0). Referring to Figure 5: ( I) If 1 and 2 defect and accept 3's offer, then 4 
cannot counter effectively and is eliminated; (2) If 2 rejects but 1 accepts, then 2 and 4 will 
punish 2 (they cannot punish 3) and (45,1 50,75,30) prevails; (3) If 1 rejects and 2 accepts, 
then 1 and 4 will punish 2 and ( 1 50,45, 75,30) prevails. Finally, if 1 and 2 reject, the situation 
becomes especially complex because neither 1 nor 2 has an incentive to try to punish 3 alone. 
As Figure 5 illustrates in the event that nature picks 2 to punish 3, 2 prefers the threat 
(0, 1 50,1 50,0) (or (45,1 50,75,30), which is equivalent from 2's point of view). That is, 
punishing 3 alone is not a primary threat, whereas if 2 defects and threatens I instead, 3
accepts and I or 1 and 4 must transfer to 2. Thus, if 1 and 2 reject, the game evolves into 
a lottery in which either 1 eventually transfers to 2 or 2 transfers to I. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the probabilities over these outcomes, both 1 and 2 have a dominant choice in 
responding to 3's initial offer -- reject. Thus, unlike a balance of power equilibrium in 
which an inessential country 4 is eliminated, 3's initial threat is rejected and country 4 
survives. Indeed, since 3 does not gain from threatening 4, 3 has no positive incentive to 
defect from the presumed equilibrium of not offering any initial threat (although, because 
there are only three essential countries in this example, 3's preference is not strong). 
6. The Weakness of Collective Security Equilibria
The preceding analysis establishes that the postulated punishment strategies support an 
equilibrium in which no one makes a threat, and no one is eliminated. Thus, collective 
security ensures the sovereignty of everyone so that, unlike balance of power, countries can 
pursue absolute welfare maximization. However, collective security equilibria share a 
weakness that renders them vulnerable. 
Returning to Figure 4, if 3 chooses before 4 and accepts 2's offer, then 4 is indifferent 
between rejecting and accepting, and it appears that sequential choice has no effect on 
collective security. However, 4's indifference rests on the supposition that if it rejects, then 
1 will punish 2 or 3 even though 1 is indifferent between punishing and defecting to the 
primary threat ( 1 50,85,65,0). Thus, if there is even the slightest chance that 1 will defect 
-- if 1 "plays with a shaky hand" -- then 4 should follow 3's lead of accepting 2's initial 
offer. This argument, of course, does not eliminate collective security as an equilibrium since 
it merely renders 3 indifferent between accepting and rejecting 2's offer. And if 3 is 
indifferent and has no incentive to defect from its punishment strategy, then 2 should pass 
rather than threaten. The difficulty, however, concerns a country's ability to judge 3's 
commitment to a punishment. If, for reasons wholly exogenous to the analysis, 2 believes that 
3 has a "sufficiently high" probability of defecting from prior agreements to punish and of 
agreeing to its offer, then the collective security arrangement breaks down. It is perhaps here 
then that we see the underlying intuition behind the notion of why regimes, consisting of "sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules; and decision-making procedures around which 
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actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1983:2), are 
an essential component of the neoliberal's portrayal of international systems. 
Thus, while the stability of a collective security equilibrium is greatly enhanced by 
subgames that allow countries to realize mutual gains, they are damaged by subgames that 
allow subsets of countries to realize such gains at the expense of others. In our example, if 
exogenous factors assure 3 some benefit from coalescing with 2 or if 3 and 2 have some sort 
of ideological affinity so that 3 prefers the outcome (40,1 50,60,50) to ( 1 50,40,60,50), then 
an all-encompassing collective security cannot be sustained, and a balance of power 
equilibrium -- which is strong and perfect - - prevails. Thus, as Keohane and Nye ( 1989:248) 
argue, "the problem [for international stability] is how to generate and maintain a mutually 
beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by governmental (and 
nongovernmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own benefit." 
7. Implications
This essay's primary objective is to give some coherence to the realist-neoliberal debate, 
and, if possible, to resolve that debate, so Table 1 summarizes the lessons of the preceding 
discussion that are important for reevaluating the issues separating realism and neoliberalism. 
Table 1 
Collective Security Balance of Power 
Does an equilibrium 
yes yes 
generally exist? 
Is the equilibrium strong 
not necessarily yes 
and perfect? 
Does the equilibrium ensure 
yes no 
everyone's sovereignty? 
Is the equilibrium sensitive 
yes no 
to sequential choices? 
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The principal lesson of our analysis, then, is that anarchy occasions both a balance of 
power and a collective security equilibrium. This fact, in turn, allows us to see why the 
realist-neoliberal debate so easily degenerates into an inconclusive argument over goals. 
Goals are endogenous and depend on which equilibrium prevails. In a balance of power, 
nations must be concerned with relative resources, because a loss of sovereignty cannot be 
precluded if they become too weak; under collective security, nations can focus on absolute 
gains since no one makes threats against the sovereignty of any state, large or small. The 
debate over goals, then, is in fact a debate over the equilibrium that is thought to prevail at 
specific points in time, as well as a debate over the relative stability of these equilibria. 
Perhaps the most disconcerting implication of our analysis to neoliberals is the fact that 
a balance of power equilibrium is attractive because it is both strong and perfect. If a 
country believes that all or nearly all other states abide by it -- if it believes that all or nearly 
all other states will coalesce freely and cannot be relied on to participate in punishments -­
it will have a positive incentive to abide by it as well and to accept primary threats when 
they are offered and to make them when it is possible to do so. Collective security equilibria, 
on the other hand, are neither strong nor subgame perfect if n = 3 and they are not perfect 
if countries move sequentially in accepting or rejecting proposals. Countries, then, can 
"wander" from such equilibria and move the system to a balance of power equilibrium. 
The neoliberal view, though, is resurrected if we take account of those welfare­
maximizing subgames, which are not a part of our model, that collective security equilibria 
allow (e.g., multilateral investments and a focus on domestic economic investment as against 
military procurement) and that render a collective security equilibrium strong and perfect. 
If defection from such an equilibrium implies not only a punishment administered by other 
states but also the inability to pursue gains from cooperation, then defection is doubly costly. 
Collective security equilibria become attractive, then, when they are nurtured in such a way 
that all or nearly all states realize gains when they abide by them. Thus, to the extent that 
international organizations facilitate trade and cooperation in the ways envisioned by 
neoliberals, collective security becomes a more secure alternative to balance of power. 
There is, however, another critically important function served by such organizations. 
Because there are at least the two equilibria that our analysis identifies, countries must solve 
a coordination problem similar to the one that arises in the Battle of the Sexes game. To 
illustrate this problem in its simplest form, suppose there are only three countries, that r0 = 
(120,100,80), and that each country must choose between a balance of power foreign policy 
(BOP) and a collective security foreign policy (CS). This simple characterization of foreign 
policy decision-making yields a normal form like the one in Table 2. That is, if either of the 
two larger countries defects from a collective security equilibrium, it is punished and must 
transfer resources to its largest opponent; but if only one such country abides by such a 
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strategy, it alone is the target of threats. 10 Thus, (BOP,BOP,BOP) and (CS, CS, CS) are both 
equilibria, and international organizations must not only facilitate the realization of mutual 
welfare gains, they must also ensure that the countries can coordinate to (CS,CS,CS). 
Country 3 
BOP cs 
Country 2 Country 2
BOP cs BOP cs 
BOP 1 10,1 10,80 1 50, 70,80 1 10, 1 10,80 70, 1 50,80 
Country I 
cs 70, 1 50,80 1 10,1 10,80 1 50, 70,80 1 20,100,80 
Table 2: Coordination Problem with Three Countries 
This coordination task seems especially important in a collective security equilibria, 
because even if no threats are observed initially, no country can be certain that others have 
not defected from or will otherwise fail to abide by appropriate punishment strategies. As 
presently formulated, our model offers no opportunity for signaling a commitment to such 
strategies, so if a sufficient number of states believe that others would participate in threats, 
the collective security arrangement is destroyed. With respect to the game in Table 2, notice 
that if country 3 abides by BOP, then BOP is a dominant choice for countries 1 and 2; but 
if 3 abides by CS, then CS is dominant for I and 2. Thus, the equilibrium that prevails
depends critically on what I and 2 believe about 3. Correspondingly, the policies associated
with collective security that maximize welfare without regard to relative gains are likely to 
be viewed as risky, with pessimists warning of dangers and questioning whether international 
organizations can perform their cooperative and coordinative functions. Indeed, we can even 
predict the permanency of realist-neoliberal debates. 
Realist-neoliberal debates, then, are readily formalized, but we should not delude 
ourselves into believing that we have overcome the hardest problems. First, our model does 
not take account of investment and endogenous resources growth. Second, we ignore the costs 
of nuclear conflict that account importantly for the US-USSR balance of power that allows 
collective security to characterize both the US and Soviet alliances. Finally, our model 
ignores uncertainty and misperception. Until we confront this complexity (which is far easier 
said than done), we cannot comprehend fully the meaning of the signals that countries 
generate by their actions and words as they try, as part of their strategies, to reveal their 
20 
commitment to particular actions or to deceive others about this commitment. Indeed, as we 
indicate earlier, the beliefs that are part of this complex signaling process not only give 
theoretical meaning to the concept of regime, but are also critically important for determining 
the types of equilibria that can prevail. Despite these limitations, however, we have 
accomplished one objective -- namely, we have embedded the alternative worlds perceived 
by realists and liberals in the same model, so that debate can now focus on a specific model's 
details and parameters. 
2 1  
Footnotes 
I .  For additional discussion of this distinction in the context of a cooperative game-theoretic 
analysis of balance of power, see Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose ( 1989).
2 . For an example of the application of stationary strategies in  a different substantive context
see Baron and Ferejohn ( 1 989)
3 . Formally,
Type 1 Threat (r,C) is a Type 1 threat -- (r,C) E T1 -- if 
I r0 max [Cl + r0(S-C) � R/2,
ii r i = 0 for all j E S-C, 
111 r max !Cl = R/2, 
iv iJ C' E W such that C' n C = (k) = (max[C']) 1' {max[C]}.
If we let Tc denote the threats that C can make, then for any C there is an infinity of Type 
1 threats in T
c
, which differ only in the distribution of r0(S-C) - [R/2 - rmaxccil among C­
(max[C]).  However, most such threats are strategically equivalent and have the same 
continuation values. So if we can associate a Type 1 threat with C, we focus on one such 
threat and ignore the others that C might make. Formally, then, let C denote all coalitions 
that have Type 1 threats, let (r,C) be a particular Type 1 threat by C, and redefine the set of 
all threats T as T 
- u c E c [Tc - ((r,C))]. Reintroducing these excluded threats leaves our 
analysis unaffected. 
4. Formally, letting T
0 
be the power set of T1 (the set of all subsets of T\ then, 
Primary Threats: TP E T0 is a set of primary threats if, 
i for no (r,C) E TP is there an (r',C') E T1 such that C n C' = {max[C]) = 
{max[C']} = (k) with both C-{k) and C'-{k) subsets of S-L; 
ii iJ (r,C) E T1 that can be included in TP without violating condition i. 
Notice that this definition necessarily renders TP unique. 
5 . Formally, if  (r,C) is a primary threat, then
r0i if j E C  and j f max[C]
R/2 if j = max[C] 
r0• if j E S-C J 
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On the other hand, if (r,C) is not a primary threat, and if we let L be those countries in S who 
can be the largest member of a minimal winning coalition, then 
{ s. r0 i if j E C n S-L
v /r ,) < R/2 if j E c n L 
s. r0 i if j E C n L and if r0 i < r0 max [S-CJ " 
6. An equilibrium is perfect if, for each i E S, no arbitrarily small probability that others defect
from their equilibrium strategies yields an incentive for i to defect.
7. That possibility that a is less than R/2 arises whenever a threat is not a primary threat in the 
sense that the threatened countries do not have sufficient resources to render their largest
opponent near-predominant. In this instance, we suppose that countries use the credible
threat of transferring all of their resources to the largest opponent. Certainly, such countries
are indifferent as to the method of elimination (indeed, a transfer may be more peaceful and
less costly than implementing a threat), whereas the recipient country have every incentive
to accept the transfer. What renders such transfers credible threats, however, is that if it is 
believed, then it forestalls elimination -- countries will prefer to make other threats -- and 
if it must be implemented, then it yields an outcome that is no worse than what prevails if 
the threat is not implemented (the threat is subgame perfect).
8. Letting L denote the countries in S who can be the largest member of a minimal winning
coalition, E the set of essential countries, and W the set of winning coalitions, then the proof
of our result about collective security equilibria requires the following lemma:
If I S  I >  3 and if I E  I >  3, then C has a primary threat only if I C  I �  3. 
If I S  I >  3 and I E  I >  3, then I S-L I�  2, since, if I S-L I= I ,  then, by definition, r(L-(i)) > 
R/2, i E L, and r((i}+S-L) > R/2, which is impossible since otherwise r(L-(i}+(i}+S-L) = r(S) 
> R. From Lemma 0 in Niou and Ordeshook ( 1989), we know that for all i E L, C = (i)+S­
L has a primary threat, but to see that C must have more than two members, suppose to the 
contrary that C = (i,j). Clearly, at least one member of (i,j} must be in L, since otherwise (i,j) 
$. W. So supposing first that i,j E L, since (i)+S-L has a primary threat, condition (iv) in the 
definition of Type- I threats is violated. Similarly, if only i E L, let (i,j) E W. Then i = 
max[S] and (i)+S-L-(j) E W; otherwise S-L-(j) are inessential. By condition (i) in the 
definition of primary threats, neither {i,j) nor {i)+S-L-{j} can form a primary threat. Q.E.D. 
9. Let i be the initial defector who proposes the threat (r,C). To eliminate consideration of cases 
for which we could easily extend the argument that follows, we assume that (r,C) E TP. The 
first thing we must show, now, is that no country defects to make an initial threat. .A..ssuming
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the continuation values in expression ( I ), we have three cases: Letting D' be the defectors in
C-(i} who approve i's proposal, 
I .  D' = C-{i}, in which case, from (e), all countries use stationary strategies, and v/fr)
equals r i for all j E C-max[C], and equals R/2 for max[C].
2. D' c C-{i}, in which case v0/r
0
) < r0i if j E D, and v0/f0
) 2. r0i otherwise.
3 . D' = (21 ,  in  which case v<i\(f
0
) < r0; and v<D/f
0
) 2. r0i for all j # i.
Thus, the only country that might have a positive incentive to defect by offering an initial 
threat is max[C], so let i 
= 
max[C] E L. However, since, from the presumed continuation 
values, no j E C-{i} has an incentive to defect by approving (r,C), D' is empty, and i is 
punished. So no one defects initially. Next, we must establish the consistency of continuation 
values in expression (2). Again we look at our three cases, since now subgames begin after 
all relevant countries have chosen between acceptance and rejection of a proposed threat. For 
case l ,  the results in Niau and Ordeshook ( 1989) establish consistency. For case 2, nature 
chooses a k E S-D to make the next (punishing) move. Clearly, if all other continuation 
values hold, k defects by not punishing one or more members of D only if it can form a 
primary threat (r',C') with members in D and if k = max[C'], since in this instance, from (e) 
and the continuation values assumed for stationary strategies, vk(r r ' ) = R/2 > r\. In this 
instance, v /fr') = r0i for all j E C' -{k} and v /fr') .s r0i for all j E S-C'. On the other hand, 
if nature chooses j E C-D, j # k, to make the next move, (j}+D cannot form a primary threat
[if (r,C) E TP, then (r'C') � TP if C' c C], so j has no incentive to defect from punishing D.
Since no j E D' can gain by defecting, and since there is some chance that they will lose, the 
expected value from defecting is less than r0i for all j E D'. Finally, for case 3 ,  let nature 
pick j E S-{i} to make the punishing move. Since, from the lemma in footnote 8, {i,j} cannot 
form a primary threat, if j defects it will be punished; hence, it has no positive incentive to 
defect, which implies that v<D ;<r 
0
) < r\ Q.E.D.
l 0. The smallest country cannot be punished because it alone cannot be the target of a primary
threat. However, it is only 3-country systems that thus "protect" any country. 
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